TITLE REGISTRATION AND LAND
LAW REFORM: A REPLY

W

MYv s S. MCDOUGAL*

RITING under the somewhat question-begging title of "The

esurrection of Title Registration" in the April, 194o, issue of
this Re.view, Professor Percy Bordwell, dean of American property law teachers, 2seeks to condemn, albeit in a half-hearted and ambiguous way, that method of keeping the public books about land which has
popularly come to be known as the Torrens System. Largely an answer to
certain uncompromising criticisms of Professor Richard B. Powell's earlier
condemnation of that system in his Registration of the Title to Land in the
State of New York, 3 Professor Bordwell's article is so temperate in tone and
so speciously reasonable, with its generous concessions, that a reader unfamiliar with the problem may miss its paradoxical quality and the utter
inconclusiveness of its argument.
The burden of Professor Bordwell's complaint is several-fold.4 The advocates of title registration, he asserts, have "largely assumed its manifest
superiority over prevalent systems of recording." To explain away the
* Professor of Law, Yale University.
x Bordwell, The Resurrection of Registration of Title, 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 470 (1940),
hereinafter cited simply as Bordwell.
2Perhaps I should make it explicit that by the argumentative tone of this reply I intend
no disrespect for Professor Bordwell. As a relative newcomer to the property field, I have found
his writings on other problems most helpful. What I am trying to show here is that, despite his
shying away from the word "Torrens," he is really on the side of the angels on this problem.
3Powell, Registration of the Title to Land in the State of New York (1938). The criticisms
Professor Bordwell cites are McDougal and Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression,
48 Yale LJ. 1125 (1939), and Fairchild and Springer, A Criticism of Powell's Book, 24 Corn.
L.Q. 557 (1939). To these could have been added the reviews by Professor Edward S. Bade in
23 Minn. L. Rev. 874 (1939) and Professor William F. Walsh in 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 5io

(1939).
4 This paragraph and the one following offer a free-handed summary of the entire article;
page citations to the various quotations are omitted.
Throughout this discussion, for sake of brevity, "registration" and "recordation" are used
as if they referred to opposing absolutes; elsewhere a colleague and I have decried this sharp
dichotomy and sought to show that the "logical outcome of any thoroughgoing reform" of the
recording system must be registration. McDougal and Brabner-Smith, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 1149. Professor Bordwell approves this effort to get away from the prejudice of "names"
which "too easily run into conceptualism." Bordwell, 472 n. 6. The context here should make
my meaning clear.
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"outstanding fact" of "the ineffectiveness," "the failure," of voluntary
registration in this country and England they have "harped" upon the
"self-interest" of solicitors and abstracters and title insurance companies
and have adopted a "Satanic interpretation of history" which "does not
get us anywhere." Experience in the Anglo-American countries demonstrates that registration must be made compulsory to amount to anything.
But why make it compulsory? "Why all this fuss about title registration?"
There has been "no such conspicuous failure" of the recording system or of
title insurance as to discredit either. Title registration cannot make land
"liquid" and "as easily transferable as a ship or a share of stock or an automobile"; such extravagant hopes are but a reflection of the fight for "free
trade in land in England." "No millennium will be wrought by a register
of title." Registration, being unsuitable for multiple interests, might, however-strange as it may seem-imperil our historic law of estates and future interests; the scrapping of such interests was a "by-product" (also the
"most outstanding feat") of the struggle for registration in England. "The
important thing to bear in mind is that the logic of registration of title is a
revolution in our land law." Finally, we have one "system of public transfers" already; why "supplant" it with another which may raise constitutional and personnel difficulties and produce a lack of "coherence and uniformity" in the common law "throughout the country"? The Torrens
System is a "foreign" system. "Regardless of the conclusiveness of the
certificate, of the desirability of cutting off stale claims and of the modem
tendency to look to the state," the case for it is not made out.
So much for the argument; now for amplification of the paradox. It
extends beyond the weird millennium-revolution inconsistency on the reforming powers of registration, beyond the final, for-the-sake-of-the-argument, concessions about the conclusiveness of the registration certificate
and the desirability of cutting off stale claims, and beyond a passing reference to certain "more substantial arguments"5 for registration: "its relative cheapness in the long run, the greater rapidity of transfer, and the
saving of lost motion." The fact is that Professor Bordwell strongly favors
title registration-or at least all of the important administrative features
of such a system. Before "anything more revolutionary" is tried, he urges,
the governmental units keeping the public books about land should establish an "adequate" official index-that is, a tract, as opposed to a grantorgrantee alphabetical index. Furthermore, the "arguments" for some
"more adequate method of trying title to land," "a comprehensive action," are "very strong." What more does title registration involve?
5More substantial than the argument for "liquidity."
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Precious little of any difficulty or danger, as we shall seek to show. Professor Bordwell, however, finds it a "far cry" to the Torrens System. What
he seems to fear is some bugaboo of "a determination of title," an unskilled
administrative "passing on the marketability of the title."
For proper appraisal of Professor Bordwell's position, and as a prelude
to a more detailed examination of his arguments and concessions, let us
look for a moment in barest outline at the relevant portions of our contemporary American institution of land transfer.
To a foreign anthropologist land transfer in the United States would
probably look, as one of my former students forcefully put it, much like an
aboriginal, ritualistic clambake. Like most other objects of "property,"
land is transferred by symbols, pieces of paper; but, unlike many of the
other symbols, these particular symbols do not pass freely from hand to
hand-their circulation is accompanied by much dilatory, costly, and extra-necessitous behavior of wise men. Transfer is normally effected by a
double-barrelled ceremony requiring both a "contract" and a "deed" and
culminating in "recordation" of at least the latter. Why the two symbols
of contract and deed? Why a period of time between "agreement" and
final "transfer"? Largely because of "title" difficulties, of "insecurities"
in the public recording system.6 The vendor must have opportunity to
prove and the vendee to determine that the vendor has what he says he
has. This requires either an elaborate search of the alphabetically-indexed
public records against every former owner of the land, beginning with a good
"root" of title at a date so distant that adverse possession must have cured
all prior defects, or else resort to the owners of some private title plant
who have kept all the entries in the public records up to date with a better
index. 7 To the danger that something may be missed in this search must
6 Other difficulties-e.g., the necessity of making financial arrangements-may of course
cause delay in closing; but the "title" difficulties, largely unique to land transfer, have undoubtedly been the major factor in molding our contemporary, complex institutional procedure.
7 For elaboration and citations see McDougal and Brabner-Smith, op. cit. supra note 3, at
1127. The first three chapters of Patton on Titles (1938) offer a relatively complete picture of
the procedure and dangers so impressionistically sketched here.
Professor Bordwell suggests that the waste motion under the present system is much exaggerated. He points to the use of abstracts and to the tract-indexed private plants. The abstract and title companies must, however, keep their books up to date by constant examination
and transcription of the public records; it is even not unknown for them to be housed in the
public buildings for their greater convenience in such work. Furthermore, under the present
system there is no assurance that any saving in labor effected by private monopoly will be
passed on to the consumer in lower costs. Finally, abstracters assume liability to a limited number of people only and title insurance is generally non-assignable; no private monopoly built on
recordation does, or can, offer as registration does a product "repeatedly available after one
principal fee." Cf. Viele, The Problem of Land Titles, 44 Pol. Sci. Q. 42X, 434 (1929).
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be added the doctrine of caveat emptor and the fact that at the present
time a multitude of interests are not even required to be evidenced in the
public records. 8 It is, hence, not unnatural that on the dosing date, when
the deed is to be delivered and the price paid or secured, a dispute not infrequently arises as to what the vendor actually has; it is notoriously a
poor lawyer who cannot find something wrong, or apparently wrong, with a
title as old as most titles are in this country. 9 Such a dispute may force the
vendor to bring suit either to quiet his title against the allegedly interested
parties or to get a court to declare, as against the vendee, that his title is
"marketable," despite possible defects."' Eventually accepting or being
forced to accept the proffered deed and land, the vendee still has no assurance that he will be able to keep the land or even be reimbursed if he loses
the land. When some ghostly defect does materialize and a claimant
"prior" to his vendor takes the land, what is his recourse? He can go back
on his vendor only if he extracted a "warranty" deed and his vendor is
still "available, solvent, and unable to escape through some of the loopholes in the highly technical judicial doctrines about covenants."" He can2
go back on his lawyer or his abstracter only if he can prove "negligence.'31
He can recover from a title insurance company only if he has made the
extra payment for such protection and probably only if he has obtained a
policy, rara avis, which does something more than guarantee a careful
9 McDougal and Brabner-Smith, op. cit. supra note 3, list nineteen categories of such interests. See also Patton, op. cit. supra note 7.
Recent statements of local problems indicate little, if any, decrease in either wasted motion or the frailties of the record. McCutcheon, Examination of Titles-The Lawyers Problem, 13 Idaho State Bar Proceedings 29 (1937); Forbes, The Title Examiner's Burden, 24 Iowa
L. Rev. (5 Bar Sec. 72) (ig39); Title Search in Virginia, 26 Va. L. Rev. 385 (194o); Real Estate
Title Standards, 12 Conn. B. J. ioo (1938); Winn, The Examination of Titles in Kentucky,
27 Ky.L.J. 194 (1939); Hendricks, Defects in Title to Real Estate and Remedies, 20 Marquette
L. Rev. 115 (1936). A dramatic, if somewhat older, account of title insecurities appears in
Crocker, The History of a Title, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 129 (1937), reprinted from io Am. L. Rev.
6o (I875).
9The fanciful defects trouble has become so bad that title lawyers are beginning to try to
outlaw it by gentlemen's agreements. Lyman, Distinguishing Apparent and Real Title Defects: Standardizing Opinions, Proceedings, A.B.A. Section on Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law (1939); Real EstateTitle Standards, 12 Conn.B.J. ioo (1938). By accepting certain
"standards" for distinguishing between "real" and "apparent" defects, title examiners promise
not to raise certain defects. This is, of course, mere whitewash for the cancers in the public
records; it probes none of the roots of the trouble. With such ineffective, costly, and cumbersome efforts, contrast registration with its clean excision of the defects in the records and of
most of the lawyer's tribulations.
xo The court declares, in effect, not that the title is "good," merely that it is highly improbable that any of the conceivable defects will ever materialize.
x McDougal and Brabner-Smith, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1129.
12 Gage, Land Title Assuring Agencies in the United States 5o, 56 (1937).
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search by the abstracter.13 Such are but minimum indications of the difficulties and absurdities of the system in which Professor Bordwell finds
no "conspicuous breakdown."
To assume the merits of an alternative system-thoroughly tried over
a long period of time in Europe, England, the British Dominions, and several of our own states4---which offers an expeditious mode of getting rid
of stale claims, which by its tract index and constant posting of the books
eliminates the tedious, costly search and the necessity of paying monopoly
prices, which by making the records for all practical purposes conclusive
insures that the bona fide purchaser will really get the land, which at negligible cost offers adequate recourse to anybody injured by the operation of
the system, and which greatly shortens and cheapens the whole process of
land transfer, would seem to be no great intellectual crime.15 Such broad
claims for title registration are not in fact "assumed"; they are not the
vain, visionary hopes of Utopian reformers, but are based on the actual
results of the practical operation of the system in places as nearby as
Massachusetts, Illinois, and Minnesota., 6 Yet Professor Bordwell relies
13 Ibid., at 9o et seq.; Walsh, op. cit. supra note 3: "Lawyers know that a policy as such is of

little value as insurance; its principal value is that it represents a thorough search which is guaranteed." Glib comparisons between title insurance and registration sometimes ignore the fact,
well-known professionally, that "title insurance" is little more than a financially responsible
system for pointing out what the defects are, not for insuring against them. The insurance
seldom adds very much to the protection afforded by the ordinary doctrines of negligence.
What is needed for cheap and adequate protection of purchasers is obviously not so much an
efficient bearer of the risk of carelessness in the discovery of defects as a removal of the defects
and hence of the risk and cost and trouble of guarding against them.
14 Powell, op. cit. supra note 3, passim.
isFor detail see Patton and Patton, Manual of Torrens Procedure (1936); Fairchild and
Springer, op. cit. supra note 3; McDougal and Brabner-Smith, op. cit. supra note 3. Note the
differences in the analyses of the costs of initial registration of Professor Powell and his reviewers, and the generally conceded low cost of subsequent transfers.
z6So much can be gleaned by a careful reading of even Professor Powell's book. See Supplements E, F, and G, Powell, op. cit. supra note 3. Note especially Richard W. Hale, Torrens
System Title Registration Proves Success in Massachusetts, Nat'l Real Estate J. (May, i939),
and letter in 26 A.B.AJ. 369 (i94o); Bade, op. cit. supra note 3; Patton and Patton, op. cit.
supra note 15. Typical of the tenor of a large number of informal communications which the
writer has received from a variety of sources are the following paragraphs by a Boston attorney:
"So far as local practice in Massachusetts is concerned, the highest compliment that can be
paid to our system of registration of titles is the fact that attorneys for lenders on real estate are
requiring all questionable titles to be taken to the Land Court for registration. I know of no
attorney who questions in any way the finality of a Land Court adjudication via registration of
title.
"Even so far as the economics of the situation are concerned, you are perfectly right in stating that the present method of examination and re-examination of titles is an uneconomic process, and that lawyers engaged in such practice may readily shift their efforts to the registration
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heavily upon "experience" in this country and England to discredit registration. His error is a simple one: it lies in failing to make a distinction between (i) the preliminary difficulties of getting a registration system
adopted and in actual use, and (2) the operation of such a system after it is
in use. The only thing that "experience" in this country or England shows,
beyond the beneficent results of actual operation indicated above, is that
a voluntary system with a costly initial registration (i.e., a "lawsuit"),
and without adequate provisions for transition from the old to the new,
cannot hope quickly to overcome public ignorance and inertia and professional opposition. There is, however, no insuperable reason why a simple
change in the keeping of the public books about a piece of land should have
to be initiated by an expensive action to quiet title,1 or why a voluntary
system should not be given the small public subsidy which would enable it
to compete with interests vested in the chaos of the recording system, 8 or
even why registration should not be made compulsory with transition provisions-requiring registration only on any new sale or mortgage when the
title must be searched anyway-which would reduce the strain on public
of titles, and thus in the course of time find similar revenue for such income as might be lost
through a shift from the present system.
"When all is said and done, there is no argument or series of arguments that can alter the
fact that a title which has been registered is good against the whole world, and renders immediately marketable (so far as title is concerned) all properties so registered. As far as efficiency of
the system is concerned the Land Court employees are all devoted to their work, efficient, helpful and extremely well-informed.
"In practice, where a registered title is involved, the transaction of mortgage or sale is hardly ever held up more than an hour or two on account of examination of title, whereas, as to unregistered titles, even the simplest of titles requires a day to a week for examination, with an
average of two or three days.
"There is very little doubt as to the sources of opposition to land title registration or as to
the reasons therefor. However, the title insurance companies and their attorney's are fighting
a losing battle because the 'streamlining' of land titles via registration would seem to be inevitable."
X7For the lawsuit could be substituted a short statute of limitations and the interim registration of a mere "possessory" title. A Comparison of Land and Motor Vehicle Registration,
48 Yale LJ. 1238 (1939). Such an expedient has been tried in England, and its working indicates, as Professor Bordwell says, "that courts have been too fussy about marketable title."
Bordwell, 478.
18Professor Bordwell objects to public subsidy as a mode of encouraging voluntary registration, preferring instead compulsory registration. Bordwell, 482. It should be remembered
that any governmental service must cost something; the important thing is what the taxpayer
gets in return. Does it cost the public nothing to maintain title lawyers, companies, and plants?
What of the mounting costs of our inefficient public "recordation" plants and of the possible
added expense of adequate public supervision of title insurance? Costs to the individual, taxpayer, or purchaser must be measured in the broader frame of reference of the whole social
problem.
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personnel and private pocketbook. 9 Surely Professor Bordwell knows that
it is not any proved demerit of registration which has precluded its wide
popular acceptance in this country. It is, of course, easy to take the frequent castigations of title lawyers and companies, to puff them at a high
level of abstraction into a "Satanic interpretation of history," and then to
ridicule that interpretation. It is quite another thing to establish relative
demerits of title registration, as compared with recording, and to get rid of
the well-known, tangible, and bitter professional opposition to registration.20
The next charge, to fortify the argument that title registration should
not be made compulsory, is that title registration cannot, as the free traders in England hoped, make land "liquid" and, hence, will work no millennium. It is true, as Professor Bordwell alleges, that registration is not a
new idea. It is much older in many places than the free trade movement
in England. 2 Professor Bordwell himself has elsewhere found its germs in
the copyhold register." With some little imagination it might even be
traced back to the bookland of the Saxons.2' More important by far, however, than ambiguous "origins" are contemporary social consequences.
Let us see if we cannot without too great strain place this vexed problem
in its proper social perspective.
19 Despite his later vague reference to constitutional difficulties, Professor Bordwell rightly
finds no constitutional difficulty in such proposed reform. "But can there be any serious
doubt," he asks, "that legislatures can change the method of land transfer if they wish to? To
ask the question is to answer it." Cf. A Comparison of Land and Motor Vehicle Registration,
48 Yale L.J. 1238 (1939). What can General MacChesney mean when he writes that the "law"
is against registration? MacChesney, Review of the book Registration to the Title to Land in
the State of New York, 26 A.B.A.J. 158 (1940).
2oA selected list of citations to secondary documentation of this opposition appears in
MlcDougal and Brabner-Smith, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1147 n. 125. Cf. also Bordwell, Registration of Title to Land, 12 lowa L. Rev. 114, 126 (1927).
Professor Bordwell writes (Bordwell, 470): "There is no more insidious self-interest than
that of a government department desiring to expand." Insidious? How so? Such "self-interest" must have as its dominant motivation, and public justification, not private pecuniary
profit but public service, and itis subject, in a democratic government, to public scrutiny, supervision and control. The mainsprings and controls of the private entrepreneur and of the public
servant are not the same; not because they are different men, but because they work in a different "institutional" context. Furthermore, Professor Bordwell is here again flaying a ghost. By
his own major argument-the ineffectiveness of voluntary systems-the will to power of registration clerks has been not so much satanic as pathetic.
21 Bordwell, Land Transfer, 9 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 127, 130 (1937); Powell, op. cit. supra note 3.
It is a little strange to find registration belittled because it is not a novel idea; usually the dialectics cut the other way.
22 Op. it. supra note 21, at 129. Cf. Walker, Genesis of Land Registration in England,
55 L.Q. Rev. 547 (1939)23 1 Vinogradoff, Collected Papers 99 (1928).
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"The fundamental purpose back of all recording" is, Professor Aigler
has aptly written,'24 "the provision of data available to the public by
which the prospective purchaser may, measurably at least, determine the
safety of dealing with the prospective vendor." We have seen how poorly,
at what cost, and how slowly the recording system provides this information and how expeditiously and cheaply registration supplies it. Still a
prospective purchaser wants something more than mere information; he
wants protection, security in his purchase, his plans, his improvementsand that registration alone can offer.2s Such information and protection
would seem indeed to be the barest minima of required encouragement to
"free enterprise" in buying and selling land; freest alienability must demand the removal of every adventitious and extra-necessitous restraint
and psychological deterrent2 6 Yet does it necessarily follow that such information and protection are not, as Professor Bordwell's attempt to tie
registration to the defunct "free trade" movement would seem to imply,
equally the barest minima which must be provided by and for a society
about to embark upon rational programs of community planning, housing
and resource conservation? Per contra, a fortiori. For the effective prosecution of such programs even more adequate information, better protection, and lowered costs would seem to be essential, and recent experience
of a wide variety of planning agencies in this country confirms the inference. 27 Drainage basin authorities have, for example, not infrequently
been forced to pay more than the cost of the land to get the title to a right
of way cleared; housing authorities have been hampered and delayed in
their demolition and reconstruction programs and often forced to costly
condemnation proceedings simply to clear up title; effective administration of all of the techniques of community planning-zoning, subdivision
control, street control, public improvements, municipal ownership-has
been found to require quick and cheap ascertainment of the interested
parties.21 Hence, whatever the social philosophy-whether "free enter24Aigler,

The Operation of the Recording Acts,

22

Mich. L. Rev. 405

(1924).

2s Recall the limitations of title insurance, iidicated supra note 13, and that it never insures

that the purchaser will actually get the land; at its best, it offers only financially responsible
recourse in case of the loss of the land. Furthermore, the "recourse" it offers may not cover any
increment in value or improvements.
26 Dicey, The Paradox of the Land Law, 21 L.Q. Rev. 221 (19o5).
27 A private purchaser who discovers something questionable about the title to a piece of
land can look elsewhere for other land; a government agency, on the other hand, which has
embarked on a large-scale housing or drainage basin program must get title to every parcel of
land in the designated area.
"s These generalizations are based largely on letters from and conversations with attorneys.
An adequate study of the experience of a variety of governmental agencies in land title acquisi-
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prise" or "collective planning" or some one of the infinite combinations of
these two polar abstractions 9 -title registration would seem to be an indispensable element in any rational program of land utilization.
It can be conceded, without weakening our argument, that registration
alone will not make land completely "liquid," an entirely reliable and
quickly realizable emergency asset; few objects of property do have that
elusive quality. Yet why should we passively continue to tolerate a business cycle which is longer and much more severe with respect to land than
with respect to any other commodity? Powers for alleviation are ready to
hand and have been thoroughly, if sporadically and singly, tested inisolated communities. What is needed is an integrated and comprehensive
program of land law reform. Registration alone can accomplish the removal of the unnecessary and adventitious restraints on alienation which
have been described above and can serve the function of supplying
quick and cheap titie information and security to planners as well as purchasers. So much and no more would be a solid gain for liquidity ! But an
tion remains to be made. Note the beginnings of such a study in Russell and Bridewell, Systems of Land Title Examination: An Appraisal, 14 J. of Land & Pub. Util. Econ. 133 (1938),
with conclusions favorable to registration. Cf. the testimony of Walker, Assistant General
Counsel, HOLC, Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power, Hearings before the
TNEC, pt. ii, Construction Industry, at Vr68. Popular literature on housing and community
planning offers confirmation. "Surprising as it may seem, experience has shown that the failure
to assemble large tracts of land by purchase alone is due as frequently to the need for clearing
doubtful titles as it is to the demand of 'hold-outs' for exorbitant prices." Walker, Urban
Blight and Slums 175 (1938) . On the title problems in a demolition program, see 2 Ford, Slums
and Housing 6o8 (i936). Heydecker, Public Ownership and Control of Urban and Suburban
Land, 26 Nat'l Municipal Rev. 56i (1937), discussing a program of general municipal land
planning, calls for: "Simplification and strengthening of present laws for registering land titles
in accordance with the well established principles of the Torrens System of title registration already used in several states." Cf. the comparison of land and securities in Monchow, California's Subdivision Control Sustained, x5 J. of Land & Pub. Util. Econ. 97 (1939). Witness the
difficulties of the FHA in Matter of City of New York (15 7 th St., Queens), 257 App. Div. 511,
13 N.Y.S. (2d) 587 (1939), noted in 40 Col. L. Rev. 145 (1940).
"9Here once more simple dichotomy is false to fact. No modem economy wholly excludes
either free enterprise or collective planning; in varying proportions and combinations the two
work side by side, if not with the greatest of ease, at least without possibility of dissolution.
Compare the five types of economic organization which Chamberlain, American Stakes 287
(i94o), finds working under the "dispensation" of "finance capitalism" in this country. The
Dicey article, op. cit. supra note 26, which Professor Bordwell cites (Bordwell, 472 n. 7) as an
"illuminating account" of the relation of registration to the "free trade" movement, is guilty
of too facile an opposition of "free transfer" and "nationalisation." Collective planning to encourage free enterprise in land transactions may be, not a philosophical nightmare, but enlightened public policy. High, polar abstractions must not be allowed to conceal the problems and
complexities, the similarities and dissimilarities, of actual underlying social organizations.
Kuse, The Right of Property 8 et seq. (1939).
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effective attack on blight and speculation and all of their attendant evils3 °
calls for much more: it calls for an integrated exercise of all the planning,
credit, and tax powers which our municipal, state, and national governments possess. 3' Such a program could, as some few people are coming to
realize, do much to remove land from the chaos of our contemporary economy, and so to provide more of the necessities of health and "the good life"
to the low-income half of our population.
By what interpretation of history, one wonders, is a mere change in the
keeping of the public books about land likely to result in-dreadful
thought-a scrapping of our historic law of estates? It comes perilously
close to the old tail-wagging-the-dog theory.32 Why should a register, a
tract index, be any more "unsuitable for the multiple common law
estates" than an alphabetical index? How, furthermore, does Professor
30 This is not the context, of course, in which to expand upon our heritage of fantastically inflated land values, slums, blighted neighborhoods, and still-born "dormitory suburbs," upon
which our institutional lenders are dependent for solvency; or upon our multiplicitous, overlapping municipal governments for the supplying of indispensable public services which are
now being underwritten to the extent of billions of dollars by the Federal Government; or upon
the more than io, ooo,ooo families-over 40,000,000 people-still housed in dwellings unfit for
human habitation, substandard by any definition of substandard; or upon the 40,ooo new farm
tenants being added annually to an already impoverished, disease-ridden peasantry; or upon
the continuous wasteful and destructive exploitation of our land and other natural resources.
The reader who requires a reminder or initiation can find an excellent, popular presentation in
Abrams, Revolution in Land (1939).
31This is in substance, though he does not adequately point it up, the plea of Abrams, op.
cit. supra note 30. A suggestive outline of part of the program appears in Heydecker, op. cit.
supra note 28. See also National Resources Committee, Our Cities: Their Role in the National Economy, pt. 3 (1937).
Professor Bordwell finds an inconsistency between registration and the use of the tax power
for policy purposes. The advocates of registration, he writes, are certainly "at the opposite pole
from the advocates of that other panacea, the Single Tax, who would deny not only all resemblance between chattels and land but also the private ownership of land." One of the major
battle-cries of the modern Georgians is, however, that the fuller taxation of land-rent will encourage and stimulate, not only a moribund, monopolistic construction industry, but also the
private use and exploitation of land, as opposed to socialization-whatever the latter may
mean. Geiger, The Theory of the Land Question i86 etseq (x936); Buttenheim, Unwise Taxation as a Burden on Housing, 48 Yale L.J. 240 (1938). By reducing the price of land, they hope
to make it more freely alienable and hence more easily utilized. The antithesis which Professor
Bordwell draws is a false one. "Resemblance" depends upon the purpose of the comparison.
When Georgians say that land, unlike "chattels," is not the product of man's labor, they are
making no statement about the mechanics of transferring either. Simplification of the mechanics of land transfer and the use of the tax power to lower land prices are far from "opposite
poles"; they are in fact, as indicated above, complementary and equally essential elements in
an integrated, comprehensive program of land law reform.

32Note also at least a faint, melancholic resemblance to the what-are-we-coming-to theory.
Don't give the reformers an inch, however reasonable the inch; they might take a mile!
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Bordwell square his fears for the "common law" estates with his later approval of the tract index? The private title companies, who presumably
cherish our "wonderful calculus" of interests, have not yet been heard
to complain about the inadequacies of such an index. In fact, it would
seem that the better and more efficiently the public books are kept the
easier and more adequate would be the protection which could be afforded
complex future interests. 33 The "complexity" of the interests which are to
be allowed in land is one problem, governed by its own peculiar policy
considerations. The way the books are to be kept is a different problemlargely a technological problem34-and hence governed by different policy
considerations. The "logic" of registration has nothing to do with a revolution in the "law of estates"; the revolution which it should accompany
is, as indicated above, in the law of land utilization. The contemporary
overlap between the law of estates and the law of land utilization is
practically nil and should be less. The only overlap is in the rare case
when a life tenant (or trustee, to add the "equitable" interests) has no
granted, judicial, or statutory power of sale 35 or when a life tenant (no
need to add the trustee here) gets caught in the meshes of a law of "waste"
inherited from medieval England and cannot make improvements.36 As
Professor Bordwell says elsewhere in his argument, "In the United States
land is freely alienable." 37 The law of "estates"-even when expanded to
take in "future interests" generally-does not today in this country de33 "Registration can be made in the name of the life tenant or owner of the possessory estate
and memorials entered upon the register and certificate indicating that the land is held subject
to certain future interests which an intending purchaser can ascertain by looking at the filed
documents creating such interests." McDougal and Brabner-Smith, op. cit. supra note 3, at
1138.
34 Title lawyers who resist improvements in the methods of keeping the public books about
land do not have the justifications of labor leaders who resist and sabotage other technological
improvements. A more apt analogy might be found in patent suppression.
3S On the continuous shrinkage of this overlap, see Recent Statutes, 37 Col. L. Rev. z238
(0937), and New York Law Revision Commission Report 355 (1935).
36 The notorious Brokaw v. Fairchild, 135 Misc. 70, 237 N.Y. Supp. 6 (1929); 231 App. Div.
704, 245 N.Y. Supp. 402 (1930); 256 N.Y. 670, 177 N.E. 186 (1931), has received statutory
repudiation in New York and is not likely to be followed by reasonably enlightened courts elsewhere. Recent Statutes, 38 Col. L. Rev. 532 (1938); New York Law Revision Commission
Report 389 (1935); Aigler, Comment, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 784 (1932).
37 Bordwell, 478. If a growing use of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry should ever
raise any practical barriers to alienability or effective utilization, a remedy could be found.
There are rumblings already: Leach, Cases and Materials on Future Interests 20, 5o n. 25 (2d
ed. 194o); Ferrier, Determinable Fees and Fees upon Condition Subsequent in California, 24
Calif. L. Rev. 512 (1936); Legislation, [r94o] Wis. L. Rev. 121. In any event-such interests
offer no great difficulty for the mechanics of registration.
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termine land utilization; its chief functions are to make possible provision
for incompetent dependents and to serve as a vehicle for tax avoidance.
Furthermore, the complexity of that law has been greatly exaggerated.
The tenuous distinctions between the various "categories" of "interests,"
the differences between the treatment of land and personalty, and the
differences between "legal" and "equitable" are much less important than
is commonly thought, and it probably would be no great tragedy if they
completely disappeared. 3 Professor Bordwell, if he is right in his dire
prophecies, has made another strong argument for registration.
The repudiation of registration because we have one "public" system already makes too much an absolute of "public." It would freeze us in an oxcart in a day of streamlined Zephyrs. One might as well argue that a bank
because it has already one system of keeping books, however inadequate,
should make no efforts to improve or change that system. Obviously, however, this cannot be what Professor Bordwell means. He makes very definite suggestions for the improvement of our existing "public" (i.e., the
recording) system. He proposes not only the tract indexes but also a new
and improved action to quiet title. Surely he could have no objectionand the whole tenor of his argument suggests that he would have no objection once the public books were put in reasonable order-to making
them more conclusive on sleeping interests-or, more exactly, putative
38 Professor Bordwell might airee. Review of the Restatement of the Law of Property, 5i
Harv. L. Rev. 565 (1938), and Review of the book Cases and Materials on the Law of Future
Interests, 21 Iowa L. Rev. 16o (1935). On the other hand, he might not. Bordwell, The Common Law Scheme of Estates, 18 Iowa L. Rev. 425, 426 (i933). In the article presently under
review he questions whether "the common law doctrine of estates is an anachronism" and wonders what we would do for "theory" about future interests in chattels without it. "Were the
law of estates and future interests abolished, we should be obliged to start all over again with
ideas based on the crude notions of property in chattels, or with something like the civil law
notion of dominium, or to throw the whole into equity as has been done in England. No one of
these three courses seems desirable." Bordwell, 477. This both overestimates the importance
of the existing "estates" categories and underestimates our powers of creative generalization
from our own recent American experience. Most of the differences between the historic categories are either praeposterous, i.e., completely in terms of legal consequences, or else verbal,
such as the difference between "so long as" and "but if." Little or no policy justification can be
found for making any difference out of any of these differences. It is not impossible to conceive
of one category of "future interest" which ignores them; in fact, we may already be approaching
such a devoutly to-be-wished-for consummation without knowing it. Justice Frankfurter's
opinion about "unwitty diversities" in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. io6 (1939), despite its
omissions from the new edition of Professor Leach's casebook, op. cit. supra note 37, is more
than a straw in the wind; it is itself a lusty gale which could blow through problems other than
taxation. Likewise, the time may come when the differences between ',aw"and "equity" are
just as antiquated in "property" as they now are in "procedure." The domain of property
awaits its Field Code, its Clark, and its "new federal rules."
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sleeping interests-than they now are. 39 That is all the dreaded Torrens
System does. What is this perilous "determination of title" which Professor Bordwell fears? It is not the expeditious, conclusive, judicial, initial
registration-probably the best action to quiet title in the country-because he approves that. 40 The danger, if any, must be in subsequent transfers after the title is cleared and the bookkeeping changed. Does this involve any "passing on the marketability" of a title? Clearly not-for two
reasons. In the first place, title registration insofar as humanly possible
gets rid of the whole "marketability" problem. That problem is caused by
fears and threats of defects in title as much as by actual de fects4--fears
that the chaotic records have not been accurately searched, that some
valid interest is not even exhibited in these records and has not been found
by outside search. It is common knowledge that, however difficult the
proof, most titles are actually good; it is the danger of the one chance out
of a hundred which forces all the costly and dilatory procedure outlined
above. Obviously title registration destroys, bag and baggage, these particular threats and dangers. In the second place, insofar as a tract index
may still indicate a multiplicity of interests in a particular piece of land,
there is no reason why the prospective purchaser should not still call in his
skilled lawyer to tell him what the register page says. 42 All the alleged unskilled public administrator has to do in operating the mechanics of the
system is to see that the deeds presented to him are executed with the
proper formalities-description of parties, description of land, signatures,
acknowledgments, seals, and so forth, including whatever the state may
39 That few people, whatever the merits or demerits of their claims to protection, would be
actually "injured" by this cutting off of sleeping interests is indicated by the relative rarity of
claims against assurance funds under registration. Powell, op. cit. supra note 3, at 223, i61,
195.
40 In any state the initial registration can be as conclusive as any action to quiet title or
statute of limitations can be made in this country. The great need is, however, for something
more than a good action to quiet titie; it is for a system of keeping the books which will make
fewer actions to quiet title necessary. Professor Bordwell writes (Bordwell, 488): "Once title is
quieted there will be little trouble about its further marketability." For how long, if registration is not substituted for recordation? The recording system, operated under the gracious
control of caveat emptor, offers no method of periodically posting the books and getting rid of
stale claims. Any comparison of the conclusiveness of registration with the "conclusiveness" of
the recording system is a comparison of strictly non-comparables; conclusiveness for all practical purposes and complete inconclusiveness belong to different realms of social fact.
4r Threats of title defects, like threats of war, may be almost as costly and troublesome as
the actual thing; preparation must be made for any eventuality.
42Professor Bordwell recognizes this in his discussion of the tract index but he minimizes
the possibility, by making the books conclusive, of getting rid of most of the roots of "marketability" trouble.
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require.43 This does not, in a day when even our own poor, benighted
American public administrators are performing so many complex functions, seem a very exacting task; it is about as rudimentary a function as
44
could be asked of a public land office.
The charge that title registration is a "foreign" system is as groundless
as it would be unpersuasive if it had grounds. Every element of registration-the action to quiet title, the tract index, the effort to make the records more conclusive, the statute of limitations, and the general zeal for
efficiency-are all now at least of good native American stock, well represented among the flora and fauna of our various states. Sir Robert Torrens, who loaned his name as a battle-cry for an Anglo-Saxon combination
of all these elements, was of course a foreigner. So what? So have been
hundreds of other inventors and promoters whose technological improvements we have borrowed. No one is suggesting "totalitarian" means for
the achievement of the demonstrably desirable end of registration; all that
is being tried is the time-honored, democratic method of "education."45
Surely it is no more "totalitarian" for a democratic state legislature to require, as several have required (with respect to land entered in "voluntary" registration systems) for more than forty years, that to be enforceable against a bona fide purchaser a title must be "registered" than it is
for such a legislature to require that to be so enforceable a title must be
"recorded." 46 Nor does registration involve any un-American invasion of
a domain where private business can effectively function. The choice here
43 Such prophylactic activity by registrars could eliminate a tremendous amount of wasteful
litigation about "formalities" and "delivery."
44 From the perspective solely of the governmental provision of information, title information is the most rudimentary kind of information which should be made readily accessible to
prospective purchasers and planners. Imagine how much it would encourage both free enterprise and rational planning if there were some central, municipal bureau which could supply
quickly and cheaply not only information about title but also information about taxes, public
services, prices, age and condition of structures, public and private restrictions, population
trends, and so forth. The saving in public expenditure by such consolidation and integration of
activities might, furthermore, not be inconsiderable.
4SThe suggestion made by many opponents of registration that there has been no great
public hue and cry for it is pointless. How can the general public be expected to demand something of which it is ignorant and which has even been misrepresented to it? I know, for example,
one able title lawyer, a man of reasonable public spirit, who does not hesitate to make ex cathedra judgments condemning registration, yet his comments indicate that he does not have the
remotest conception of what the system involves. One function of the disinterested student
should be to try to create a demand for new and improved social institutions. Cf. Lynd,
Knowledge for What? (i939).
46 Professor Bordwell well says (Bordwell, 478): "But the right of the owner of land to

choose between an alphabetical index under the prevailing system and a tract index under registration hardly seems to be of the essence of liberty."
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is not, as General MacChesney poses it, between doing business with a
private agency or a public agency. 47 The question is not whether certain
business will be left in private hands or transferred to the government,
but whether an admittedly public function-the keeping of books about
land transfers--shall be performed so badly as to make necessary an otherwise unnecessary private business.41 The logic of General MacChesney's
position must drive him to the view that the public should not collect any
title information about land, to a denial of the most rudimentary function
which a public land agency can perform. It has long been recognized, however, that the necessities of cost and efficiency make the collecting of title
information essentially a "monopoly" business and that the added necessity of even reasonable protection for purchasers makes it unquestionably
a "public" business. It is simple common sense that what the government
must do, it should be permitted to do well.
The problem of land transfer, insoluble by obsessive reiteration of ancient bromides about individualism or by making the eagle scream with
far-fetched analogies, is rightly nothing more than a question of organizational efficiency and of cost and protection to the consumer. From such a
perspective, despite General MacChesney's and Professor Bordwell's insistence that "it can't happen here," the day for title registration in this
country is just beginning to dawn: it has no need of "resurrection"; it is
far from dead; it is big with all the life of the swelling contemporary demands of millions of people for livable homes, in a livable environment, at
an approachable price and of other millions for some kind of farm security; it may not "save" these millions for some far-flung millennium; but it
is an indispensable, if perhaps minor, element in a comprehensive program
for the rehabilitation of a substantial part of their lives.
47 Book review, op. cit. supra note ig.
48When General MacChesney writes, op. cit. supra note ig, at i59, of the "vested interests"
of the "public" and of "landowners" in the "recording system," his meaning escapes my
grasp.

